There is also no place which is more regulated than the cockpit of an aircraft. Vast volumes of documents published by lawmakers, regulators and even the manufacturer of the aircraft and its subsystems have large manuals and instructions which must be observed to the letter.
It is no surprise then, that the flight restrictions which have been imposed upon general aviation (GA) for the duration of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup (SWC) have been a matter for great concern and discussion by pilots and general aviation aircraft owners and operators.
AOPA has therefore engaged in an in-depth analysis of these restrictions and the impact this has on GA. Several experts from various branches of the aviation industry as well as a number of erudite legal professionals (several of whom are pilots themselves) and aircraft owners and operators have given their time, expertise and opinions in researching this matter.
BACKGROUND
The need for restrictions emanated from stipulations by FIFA for security for the World Cup. In this regard, FIFA usually engages the services of private security companies. Previously, Group 4 Securicor (G4S) has been engaged for providing security for various sporting events including the Olympics.
G4S, one of the largest security companies in the world which operates in more than 100 countries, was an early contender for the 2010 SWC. Curiously, the South African Police Services (SAPS) also entered the bidding for providing security services for this event.
At about the same time as the SAPS entered the bidding, a large-scale campaign against G4S was launched by a number of trade unions, claiming that G4S was guilty of disregarding labour laws, failing to honour court orders, conducting campaigns against and refusing to recognize labour unions.
Eventually G4S withdrew from the bidding, CE Nick Buckles stating that it was concerned about the tournament’s organization. “We are not going to be involved because we don’t think the security is going to be that good — they are not that well organised yet,” Buckles said.
The result was that the SAPS picked up the contract. The SAPS and its officers are therefore being paid to act as private security guards for FIFA. AOPA has several concerns in this regard, not least of which is that this is in clear contravention of section 3 of the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, an offence which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life.
Of course, this decision was made at the highest levels, so investigation of corrupt activities, including unwarranted pressure from tame trade unions, are unlikely to ever going to be investigated.
In 2009 Deputy National Commissioner Andre Pruis instructed Commissioner for Civil Aviation Colin Jordaan to impose flight restrictions on GA whereby temporary restricted airspaces with a radius of 50 nautical miles around soccer stadiums would be established for the SWC as well as the Confederations Cup and a number of “exercises”.
These restricted airspaces were promptly and dutifully promulgated without following the procedures mandated by ICAO or following the requirements for consulting with the National Airspace Committee (NASCOM). The South African Air Force (SAAF) was nominated to administer these restrictions.
When called upon by AOPA to provide reasons for his actions in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000, Colin Jordaan flatly refused to do so, claiming that he had no choice but to comply with the SAPS’ demand that he comply with their contractual obligations to FIFA.
AOPA was also refused any opportunity to respond to the imposition of restrictions in terms of the rights to do so by any party whose rights are adversely affected thereby.
To add insult to injury, it appears that Jordaan decided to impose the restrictions without applying his mind and simply rubber-stamped the directions from the Police Commissioner. The weak response from Jordaan was that persons failing to comply with the restrictions would be prosecuted in terms of the SAPS’ and SAAF’s laws and that AOPA could be found guilty of incitement to break such laws. AOPA’s subsequent research has revealed that there are no laws which could possibly support such prosecutions and these threats amount to no more than bluster.
The lawyers for AOPA pointed out to Jordaan that in obstinately failing to comply with a multiplicity of laws, the restrictions imposed were of no force or effect and were liable to be set aside. This has also been ignored.
As a result of this arrogant approach which precluded the possibility of aviation representative bodies such as AOPA from contributing towards both reducing the impact of the restrictions upon GA and also assisting in reducing the threat of aerial attacks, AOPA considered the option of bringing an application to court to set aside the flight restrictions on the basis that they are blatantly unlawful.
AOPA was overwhelmed by the support it received from GA, both financially and by way of information and evidence.
However, after considerable discussion AOPA came to the following conclusion:
The only legal remedy available was to set aside the restricted airspaces and any restrictions that flow from this. This was not AOPA’s purpose. Although
AOPA considers the restrictions to be grossly inadequate and mere grandstanding by the authorities, it would be reckless to set aside the only defence we have.
Instead, AOPA has decided to implement its “Airport Watch” scheme which was developed by AOPA in the USA together with the US Transport Safety Administration.
The implementation of this is based on the following factual research.
THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTIONS ON GENERAL AVIATION
The flight restrictions require pilots to apply for a security screening code (SSC) from the SAAF and to apply for authorization for each flight at least 24 hours before each flight within the 50nm zones around each soccer stadium.
For commercial aviation operations such as air charter and for recreational pilots, these restrictions are not particularly onerous. For charter and recreational flying, the pilots and operators usually know at least a couple of days in advance when they will be flying.
However, for those individuals and businesses that use aircraft for ad hoc operations, the restrictions cause great difficulty. In many instances, the need to get an aircraft into the air may have life or death consequences. These include operations dealing with medical and security emergencies as well as support operations for equipment and installations which are of an essential nature. As one AOPA member involved in stolen vehicle recoveries stated, it is essential that their helicopter reach a tracked hijacked vehicle as soon as possible, since the hijackers usually abandon the vehicle as soon as the helicopter arrives and generally refrain from harming their hostages. Without such prompt support, it is likely that more crime victims will die or suffer injury.
Obviously, waiting 24 hours (or even 3 hours) for SAAF authorization is ridiculously impractical.
Flying schools are always the victims of poor weather and have to arrange their flying around meteorological events. The additional burden of complying with these ineffective restrictions basically shuts down most flying school operations. This was evidenced during the Confederations Cup and related exercises.
Even recreational aviation has been adversely affected. During previous restriction periods, there was very little activity indeed. GA and related industries have therefore been extremely adversely affected.
THE THREAT TO THE WORLD CUP
Other than a few allusions to “top secret” threats by Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) personnel and a few wildly speculative articles in the press regarding Al Qaeda plots to disrupt the SWC, there has been a steadfast refusal by the authorities to disclose precisely what kind of threat the restrictions are intended to counter.
History shows that the threat of a terrorist attack on such an event by GA aircraft is miniscule. That said, however, AOPA is well aware that in the very unlikely event of such an attack, the impact upon GA, not just nationally, but worldwide would be enormous.
AOPA therefore has taken the position that all possible steps to counter such a threat should be taken. For this reason, AOPA has thoroughly investigated the possible threats of an aerial attack upon the SWC and the measures which could be taken to counter such an attack.
There are no instances where terrorists have used GA aircraft in an attack. This is in contrast to the 9/11 attack upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. In this instance, large scheduled airliners were hijacked by passengers. Although AOPA has some concerns about the lax and ineffective security at some airports used by airlines, that is not the thrust of this document.
The handful of attacks upon persons and property using GA aircraft seem to fall into a rather specific category which is neither political nor terrorist in nature. The well publicized incident of Frank Eugene Corder is typical of this type of attack.
On 12 September 1994 Frank Eugene Corder crashed a stolen Cessna 150 onto the south lawn of the White House in Washington DC. Apparently trying to hit the building, he was killed and was the sole casualty.
Briefly, Corder’s background revealed past arrests for theft and drug dealing and had been sentenced to spend 90 days at a drug rehabilitation centre from which he had been released in February 1994. Thereafter Corder was living with his third wife who left him three weeks prior to the incident. It is though that this had driven him to deep depression and suicide. Friends claim he bore no ill will towards President Bill Clinton (who was not even there at the time), but likely only wanted the publicity of the stunt.
Although the White House is rumoured to be equipped with surface-to-air missiles, none were fired.
A similar case was where Robert K Preston, a US Army private, stole an Army UH-1 Iroquois helicopter, flew it to Washington DC and hovered for six minutes over the White House south lawn before landing. He again took off and was chased by two police helicopters but returned to the White House where officers fired on him with shotguns and submachine guns. Preston was lightly injured and landed his helicopter. After being taken into custody Preston indicated he was upset over not being allowed to continue training to be a helicopter pilot, and staged the incident to show his skill as a pilot.
In the very few similar incidents, the individual concerned was unstable and irrational, suffered severe depression due to financial, situational or emotional distress, and often the abuse of drugs and/or alcohol also played a part.
Perhaps the most famous of all such events was the flight of Matthias Rust from Helsinki to the Red Square in Moscow in a rented Cessna 172 on 28 May 1987. He told air traffic control he was going to Stockholm, but then turned to the east and shut down all his communication equipment. Although he appeared on Soviet air defence radar and was tracked by three surface-to-air missile divisions, he was not fired upon. Two interceptors were dispatched to investigate but were not given permission to engage the aircraft. The fighters lost contact and he disappeared off radar. Air defense re-established contact with Rust's plane several times, but confusion followed all of these events. After landing in the Red Square, Rust was tried and sentenced to four years imprisonment for hooliganism.
Perhaps the most important lesson from all of these incidents is that these characters did not pose any serious threat to public safety and shooting them down and killing them would simply be murder. Another lesson is that even the greatest air defences can be evaded in a small aircraft.
The United States Transport Safety Administration has now, after several years of investigation, concluded that there is no credible threat of a terrorist attack using GA aircraft.
Although there does not appear to be any credible threat of a terrorist attack in a light aircraft, this cannot be entirely ruled out. However, there are factors to consider.
It is unlikely that the current restrictions and SAAF preparations would be able to prevent an attack. Indeed, a number of exercises performed by the SAAF revealed that less than 20% of staged interceptions were successful. Even if an aircraft were detected, there would be considerable uncertainty about whether its actions constitute a threat or not, as well as the considerable risk to persons on the ground should the aircraft be shot down. On the other hand, an attacker would be very unlikely to get away with, for example, dropping a bomb on a soccer stadium and flying off.
It should be concluded therefore that any attacker would be well aware that his attack would almost certainly be a suicide mission.
AOPA has therefore come to the conclusion that the present restrictions would be of little use in preventing an attack and the restrictions have more to do with the desire of the SAPS and SAAF to grandstand to the detriment of general aviation.
Indeed, Deputy CEO of the SA Institute had this to say: “[police commissioner Bheki] Cele is very fond of the ‘shoot ‘em up’ style of policing. But one does not fight terrorism by abseiling down buildings with machine guns and playing cowboys. One fights terrorism in back rooms in operations that are never made public.” “Thanks to these childish public displays, any terror group knows what they are up against.”
DEALING WITH THE THREAT
As has been detailed above, the threat largely involves either suicidal terrorists or disturbed individuals who typically use stolen aircraft to achieve their political ends or commit suicide in a perceived blaze of glory.
The SAAF and SAPS are hopelessly ill-equipped to deal with this threat. Their staff are untrained, unqualified and unsophisticated when having to detect impending aerial havoc. They seem to be much more preoccupied with being seen to be doing something by harassing and inconveniencing the innocent and the law-abiding.
The SAPS and SAAF are so expending much of their resources on embarrassingly third-world displays of jets thundering overhead and troops leaping from buildings and helicopters while ignoring the intelligence-gathering functions which are essential to preventing the very attacks they profess to be challenging.
On the other hand, pilots themselves are very well-equipped to detect out-of-the-ordinary events and suspicious behaviour which a simple cop just would not notice.
Utilizing the approximately ten thousand eyes of South Africa’s pilots would contribute greatly toward the security of the SWC – not to mention maintaining the freedom of GA.
SO, WHAT SHOULD YOU DO?
The AOPA Airport Watch program has implemented a GA Hotline 082-808-9834. The hotline serves as a centralized reporting system for GA pilots, airport operators, and maintenance technicians to report suspicious activity at their airfield. AOPA Airport Watch has established lines of communication will be able to immediately contact the relevant authorities to deal with the threat.
Lock Up – Secure Your Aeroplane
· Become familiar with and practice existing airport security procedures.
· Utilize aircraft door locks at all times when the aircraft is unattended.
· Consider the use of auxiliary locks to further protect aircraft from unauthorized use.
· Consistently lock hangar doors and close security gates to prevent unauthorized access or tampering.
· Properly secure ignition keys separate from aircraft.
Security begins with your own aircraft. Crime usually happens because of opportunity, while terrorism is generally pre-planned and choreographed. Don't ever make it easy for either. Similar actions can be taken to avoid both crime and terrorism. Always secure your aircraft. Most pilots do this by locking the aircraft's doors, regardless of whether the aircraft is hangared or tied down outside.
Many owners already use auxiliary locks to further protect their aircraft from unauthorized use. If you don't, consider how much less expensive it is to add a lock than to have someone steal your aircraft. Options available include a variety of locks for propellers, throttle, and prop controls. Pilot supply catalogs have a wide range of products to deter tampering and the theft of your aircraft.
Once your aircraft is locked, take home all your keys—aircraft, hangar, and auxiliary locks. To make it as difficult as possible for someone to gain access to your aircraft, you might want to consider whether you keep your aircraft key on the same keychain as your hangar key. Little changes can make all the difference.
Look Out
- Anyone trying to access an aircraft through force—without keys, using a crowbar or screwdriver.
- Anyone unfamiliar with aviation procedures trying to check out an aircraft.
- Anyone who misuses aviation lingo—or seems too eager to use all the lingo.
- People or groups determined to keep to themselves.
- Anyone who appears to be just loitering, with no specific reason for being there.
- Out-of-the-ordinary videotaping of aircraft or hangars
- Dangerous cargo or loads—explosives, chemicals, openly displayed weapons—being loaded into an aircraft.
- Anything that strikes you as wrong—listen to your gut instinct, and then follow through.
- Pay special attention to height, weight, and the individual's clothing or other identifiable traits.
- Any pilot or student pilot who seems depressed or has suffered emotional hardship and expresses suicidal or reckless ideations.
Provide details: Be specific in details whenever you report something amiss to authorities or the GA Hotline. Generalized concerns (e.g., "That guy looked shifty to me.") may not carry the appropriate sense of urgency. Be alert, report aircraft with unusual or obviously unauthorized modifications, and people or groups who seem determined to keep to themselves.
Details carry weight: "I'm at the Anytown Municipal Airport and just saw something dangerous loaded into a tan-and-orange airplane with tail number ZS-XXX. The pilot seems to be intimidated by his passengers; the passengers are keeping out of sight. I think something bad is about to happen." Pay attention to height, weight, clothing, or other identifiable traits.
Never approach someone you fear may be about to commit an illegal act or crime. Make some notes, such as the person's appearance, clothing, car number plate, type of aircraft, registration, and colouring. If appropriate, take a picture, but keep your distance if the situation seems hostile. If you can't safely contact authorities or the airport management without exposing yourself to risk, leave the field or go to your car and talk on your cell phone. It could be your best weapon in fighting airport crime.
Together we can make general aviation an unattractive option to terrorists or criminals!
DEALING WITH THE AUTHORITIES
Wherever possible comply with the restrictions. Do not challenge police officers. They did not make the rules and may respond violently. If SAPS or SAAF officers attempt to interfere with legitimate aviation activities, call the GA Hotline and provide as much information as possible.
AOPA has considerable resources available and officers who unlawfully interfere with your rights and legitimate activities will be arrested by AOPA’s security officers and duly prosecuted. Where appropriate, AOPA will assist in interdicting persons who overstep their authority and will also help with claims for losses which may be suffered as a result of over-zealousness.